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In January 2026, Iran imposed what monitoring groups describe as a nationwide internet shutdown that left tens of millions of people with severely restricted access for close to three weeks. Rights organisations link the blackout to a new wave of protests and a security crackdown, and say the loss of connectivity made it harder to verify what was happening on the ground. During earlier protest cycles in Iran, some groups have alleged very high casualty figures, but confirmed numbers for the January 2026 events remain contested and difficult to document. What is clear from network data is that fixed‑line and mobile operators were ordered to cut or sharply limit service, and that entire regions were effectively cut off from the global internet for days at a time.

Blackout translated into Silence

For people inside Iran, the shutdown meant familiar tools stopped working at once: messaging apps failed to connect, streaming and publishing platforms would not load, and even basic web browsing became unreliable or impossible. For those outside the country trying to follow events, the blackout translated into silence from areas where protests and arrests had been reported only hours earlier. VPN services reported a surge in attempted connections just before and during the restrictions, as users tried to keep some channels open. In many cases these efforts were blocked as authorities tightened technical controls on international traffic.

Uganda: elections under a digital curtain

A few weeks before the Iran blackout, Uganda again restricted online access during an election period. Authorities ordered providers to block or throttle social media and other major platforms, and in parts of the country connectivity dropped to the point where most users could not get online at all. This followed a pattern seen in previous Ugandan elections, when the government used a mix of platform‑specific blocks and wider network shutdowns around voting and counting.

Data from Proton’s VPN Observatory shows sharp spikes in sign‑ups and usage from Uganda in the days before and during the January 2026 vote, mirroring similar surges documented during the 2021 shutdown. The measurements underline how quickly people move to circumvention tools when they fear another cut. They also show the limits of these tools when network operators receive clear orders to close or severely restrict access, sometimes with little public explanation of the legal basis.

Censorship as Service

The shutdowns in Iran and Uganda sit alongside quieter forms of control built into everyday infrastructure. For more than a decade, researchers at the Citizen Lab have documented the spread of commercial filtering and surveillance equipment sold to governments worldwide. The “Planet Blue Coat” project mapped Blue Coat ProxySG and PacketShaper devices on public networks in 83 countries, including Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, India, Kenya, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela, and noted that these devices are technically capable of both censorship and surveillance. The “Planet Netsweeper” research found Netsweeper installations in at least 30 countries, with rights‑impacting filtering of political, social and news content in places such as Afghanistan, Bahrain, India, Pakistan, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, the UAE and Yemen.

Other investigations have linked Sandvine’s PacketLogic equipment to website blocking and traffic manipulation in countries including Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia, in some cases involving the redirection of users to malware or surveillance pages that targeted independent media and opposition sites. These cases show how decisions made in vendor boardrooms and export offices shape what people can see and say online in far‑away jurisdictions.

Chinese platforms and “upgrade” moments

More recent leaks have drawn attention to Chinese exporters. Documents analysed by journalists and researchers describe how companies such as Geedge Networks market complete censorship platforms to foreign states, bundling hardware, software, installation and remote operation. The leaks link Geedge systems to projects in Myanmar, Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ethiopia, and show dashboards designed to monitor tens of millions of connections at once, identify and block VPNs and apps, and apply central content rules across a country’s main networks.

Network rewired

Human‑rights groups and technical monitors have noted that after major shutdowns, new blocking patterns often appear. VPNs and tools that worked before no longer connect, specific apps become unreachable and traffic measurements suggest new deep packet inspection rules and routes have been introduced. In that sense, a silence such as the one imposed in Iran in January 2026 may not only hide protests and arrests from outside view; it may also be the moment when the network itself is rewired, so that when people finally come back online, the internet they find is narrower than the one they lost.

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In early 2026, Iran and Uganda again showed how quickly a government can pull the plug on the internet when protests and elections feel risky.

Iran’s January shutdown left tens of millions with severely restricted access for close to three weeks, cutting off basic communication as security forces moved against demonstrators. In Uganda, authorities used election‑period blocks and throttling to limit what voters could see and share.

At the same time, investigations track how commercial filtering and surveillance tools from Western and Chinese companies make these shutdowns more targeted and harder to evade. From DPI boxes to full “Great Firewall”‑style platforms, decisions taken in vendor boardrooms now shape what people can read and publish in Tehran, Kampala and beyond.

For artists, journalists and independent media, this is not an abstract technical shift. It is the difference between being able to show the world what is happening, or disappearing from view when it matters most.

#DigitalRights #InternetShutdowns #Iran #Uganda #Censorship #ArtisticFreedom #HumanRights #MimetaMemos

France24 / AFP: “Countries using internet blackouts to boost censorship: Proton” (live‑news article, 4 Feb 2026).[france24]
Coverage of the January 2026 Iran blackout and protests, including reporting on near‑total disruptions and partial restorations.france24+3
Human Rights Watch, report “Disrupted, Throttled, and Blocked: State Censorship, Control, and Increasing Isolation of Internet Users in Russia” (and related news release).hrw+3
Proton VPN Observatory main page, explaining methodology and examples of spikes before shutdowns.techradar+1
Proton VPN posts and coverage on Uganda’s election‑period shutdowns and associated VPN spikes.protonvpn+1
Citizen Lab, “Planet Blue Coat: Mapping Global Censorship and Surveillance Tools” and related summary on “countries of interest”.citizenlab+2
Citizen Lab, “Planet Netsweeper: Executive Summary” and follow‑up coverage on rights‑impacting filtering.citizenlab+3
Documentation and advocacy materials on Sandvine / PacketLogic deployments and use for blocking and injections in multiple countries.apc+1
Investigative reporting on Geedge Networks and export of Chinese censorship platforms, including Wired’s feature on the Geedge leak, Jamestown Foundation analysis, and related articles.wired+5
General DPI and lawful interception market and technology backgrounders.strategicmarketresearch+2